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Abstract
Anti-blasphemy laws have endured criticism in light of the modern, secular and 
democratic state system of our time. For example, Ethiopia’s criminal law 
provisions on blasphemous utterances, as well as on outrage to religious peace 
and feeling, have been maintained unaltered since they were enacted in 1957. 
However, the shift observed within the international human rights discourse 
tends to consider anti-blasphemy laws as going against freedom of expression. 
The recent Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 34 calls for a 
restrictive application of these laws for the full realisation of many of the rights 
within the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Secularism and 
human rights perspectives envisage legal protection to the believer and not the 
belief. Lessons can be drawn from the legal framework of defamation which 
considers injuries to the person rather than to institutions or to the impersonal 
sacred truth. It is argued that secular states can ‘promote reverence at the public 
level for private feelings’ through well-recognised laws of defamation and 
prohibition of hate speech rather than laws of blasphemy. This relocates the role 
of the state to its proper perspective in the context of its role in promoting 
interfaith dialogue, harmony and tolerance.
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The secular as ‘an epistemic category’, and secularism as a value statement, 
have been around since the 1640s Peace of Westphalia, otherwise called the 
‘peace of exhaustion’, and they remain one of the contested issues in today’s 
world political discourse. The 1648 Peace Treaties of Westphalia were the
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outcome of five years of negotiation that brought to an end the Thirty Years’ 
War.1 This Peace, as Derek Croxton describes it, was credited for ‘denying 
altogether the religious basis of secular authority’.2 Accordingly, it ‘terminated 
the Pope’s claim to universal authority and confirmed the diplomatic 
independence of secular rulers’.3 However, the meaning of the secular is itself in 
a continuous state of articulation and re-articulation, casting doubts also on its 
attributes. Scholars continue to question what it means and its desirability for the 
modern state system. For instance, constitutions of countries astutely declare the 
separation of state and religion, and the prohibition of the use of the political 
apparatus for religious agenda.4 Does that mean that these legal stipulations 
alone make that particular country more secular than the ones which do not have 
these provisions? Or is being secular an attribute of the society, the existence of 
which requires something more than a legal declaration on the duality of state 
and religion as such? Calls for a space for religion in a multicultural and 
democratic context are on the rise, in an open acknowledgement to the changing 
global dynamics where it is increasingly declared that ‘separation of state and 
religion is no guarantee of free exercise of religion and belief.5 Abdullahi an- 
Na’im, a renowned scholar on Islam and human rights, was quoted as saying ‘I 
need a secular state to be a Muslim. ... If I don’t have the freedom to disbelieve, 
I cannot believe’.6
where the coercive tools of the state such as the criminal law, family code 
and institutions by which the state controls societal behaviour are highly 
dominated by religious ideals of one kind or another, references to that state as 
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seems merely nominal when one observes the significance that the secular laws 
place on the ‘Jewish Heritage’. Apart from the provision in its Proclamation of 
Independence defining the State of Israel as a ‘Jewish State’,* 8 a 1980 law of the 
Knesset provides that:
Where a court is required to decide a legal question for which there is no 
answer in statutory law, judicial precedent, or by analogy, the question shall 
be determined in the light of the principles of freedom, justice, equity and 
peace of the Jewish people.9
This stipulation establishes, as S. I. Strong has observed, ‘an explicit connection 
between Jewish law and Israeli secular law’,10 blurring the line that distinguishes 
the secular from the religious, the individual from that of the public.
In view of this, the meaning of the secular in today’s multicultural setting 
requires further examination. This article is therefore an attempt to stir up the 
debate in the context of those states embracing a growing number of religious 
players with high levels of populist appeal both within and outside the secular 
space. For this, the doctrine of blasphemy is used, to showcase the dynamics 
involved in trying to move towards so-called secular statehood.
In the first section of this article, an attempt is made to articulate the concept 
of secularism in the context of both historical and contemporary settings. 
Section 2 analyses the law of blasphemy within the secular state system. We 
shall observe in this section how modernisation has antagonised itself with 
religiocentrism and continues to push the religious to a separate space of ‘the 
personal’ from that of ‘the public’ or the secular. This shift is to come at the cost 
of discarding legal protection for the ‘sacred’ through, amongst other means, the 
anti-blasphemy laws.
Defamation as a legal framework that considers injuries to the person rather 
than to institutions, or the impersonal sacred truth, is discussed in Section 3. In
provision on defamation, Article 613. The regional family codes permit multiple 
marriages in express endorsement of the Islamic laws.
8 The Proclamation of Independence that established the State of Israel lauded the 
UNGA Resolution 181 of 1947 calling for the establishment of the Jewish State as an 
acknowledgement of ‘the natural right of the Jewish people to be masters of their fate, 
like all other nations, in their own sovereign state’. See Declaration of the 
Establishment of the State of Israel 1948, The Provisional Government of Israel 
Official Gazette, No 1, Tel Aviv, Para 10. By limiting the right to sovereignty to only 
Jewish people, S.I. Strong argues that ‘the Proclamation of Independence could be said 
to be creating a national identity that advances one trait [being Jewish] at the cost of all 
others.’ See S.I. Strong, (1997) ‘Law and religion in Israel and Iran: How the 
integration of secular and spiritual laws affects human rights and the potential for 
violence’, Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, pp 109-218, p 146.
9 See Foundations of Law Act, 5470-1980 cited in S.I. Strong, id, p. 147.
10 See ibid.
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so doing, the article examines the propriety of repealing blasphemy laws in the 
light of some recent UN dispensations that have emerged within the context of 
enlarging the space for free speech.
1. The Meaning of the Secular
On 18th October 2010, BBC Radio channel 4 broadcast an analysis entitled 
‘Turkey: Staying Secular Insha’Allah.’ That statement was made by a woman 
wearing a headscarf among demonstrators in defence of the Ataturk’s Legacy.11 
She was asked whether she is worried that Turkey will become a Shari’a state, to 
which she replied ‘no, Turkey will remain secular, Insha’Allah’.12 The few 
billionaires in Turkey who are economically vibrant (known as the Anatolian 
Tigers) are highly Islamist, though the country strives to redefine itself as a 
secular state for a number of reasons, of which the fundamental one is to 
integrate itself into the European Union. The deeply entrenched social divisions 
in the contemporary Turkish polity form a line that separates the religious 
conservatives and the secularists, the latter viewing the European Union as a 
guarantor of trust between these two segments.13 Those dominant economic 
actors, though supportive of capitalism, are not that interested in the western 
model of liberal democracy and are thus openly critical of the west and anything 
pro-Western.
The society’s day to day life itself is highly informed by this elite’s 
endorsement of religious conservatism. The BBC Radio 4 analysis, also noted 
that, in Turkey, a person needs to fast, or at least pretend to, as a skill of 
survival. Failure to observe the main Islamic rituals would result in the loss of a 
job, or if a trader, the loss of clients. Moreover, as is the case in the UK with 
regard to the Church of England, the government of Turkey finances the Islamic 
religion. As Daver once observed, ‘almost sixty thousand religious officials 
receive their salary from the state budget’.14 These value differences between the 
conservatives and those that aspire to redefine the political life of the state 
towards the secular characterise a number of states in today’s world. Mention 
could immediately be made of such states as Nigeria, Iran, and Egypt.
11 The Ataturk Legacy is deemed to constitute the basis on which the modern republic of 
Turkey has been built, which particularly meant the mixture of secularism and 
nationalism. See in general Cooper, Malcolm (2002), ‘The legacy of Ataturk: Turkish 
political structures and policy making’, International Affairs (Royal Institute of 
International Affairs), Vol. 78, No 1, pp 115-128.
12 See BBC Radio 4 Analysis, ‘Turkey: Staying Secular Insha Allah’, 18 Oct 2010.
13 See Ioannis N. Grigoriadis (2009), ‘Islam and Democratisation in Turkey: Secularism 
and trust in a divided society’, Democratisation, Vol. 16, No 6, pp. 1194-1213.
14 See Bulent Daver , (1969), ‘Secularism in Turkey’, Review of the Faculty of Political 
Sciences, University of Ankara, pp 29-40, at 30.
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Simply put, secularism as a modem society’s organising principle could 
mean the separation of state and religion, the former being solely dependent on 
policies informed by reason, and the latter as a distinct socio-cultural construct 
that operates on a separate plane. The state as the moderator of the public realm 
must, of necessity, refrain from sponsoring religions in order to be characterised 
as secular. Thus, a dualism is supposed to prevail between the public and the 
private, the political and the religious, reason and a belief in the supernatural, the 
scientific and the transcendental, the universal and the particular, the democratic 
and its negation, etc. in this sense, Berkes and Ahmad trace the use of the term 
secularism to two Latin words; ‘Saeculum’ and ‘Laicism’15 They then note as 
follows:
While the underlying emphasis in the word [saeculum] is on the idea of 
worldliness, the term ‘laicism’ emphasises the distinction of the laity from the 
clergy. Both terms, however, refer to two aspects of the same thing. They 
were used in connection with the problems of duality, opposition, or 
separation of church and state. The church represented the highest authority 
over the spiritual sphere and the state the highest authority over temporal 
matters.16
Moreover, this dichotomy existed relatively early in the history of the West than 
in any of the other ‘civilisations’ as explained by Samuel Huntington. According 
to Huntington, this distinction has, among other things, contributed immensely 
to the development of freedom in the West:
Throughout Western history, first the church and then many churches existed 
apart from the state. God and Caesar, church and state, spiritual authority and 
temporal authority, have been a prevailing duality in Western culture. Only in 
Hindu civilisation were religion and politics so distinctly separated. In Islam, 
God is Caesar; in China and Japan, Caesar is God; in Orthodoxy, God is 
Caesar’s junior partner. The separation and recurring clashes between church 
and state that typify Western civilisation have existed in no other 
civilisation.17
However, the boundary between these dualities is very much contested. A glance 
at Turkey, or even Ethiopia or Nigeria, would reveal the challenges that confront 
a simplistic description of secularism as the separation of state and religion. 
Even if this dichotomy is claimed to prevail in modern liberal democratic
15 Saeculum originally meant ‘age’ or ‘generation’ and later came to refer to ‘the 
temporal world.’ And ‘laicism’ is derived from Greek Laos (the people) and Laikos 
(the lay). See Niyazi Berkes & Feroz Ahmad (1998), The Development of Secularism 
in Turkey, (London: C. Hurst & Co., Ltd.), p 50.
16 Ibid.
17 See Huntington, Samuel (2002), The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World 
Order (United Kingdom: Free Press), at 70.
34 Mizan Law Review Vol. 7 No.1, September 2013
systems, the influence that each plays over the other is unmistakably clear. The 
‘in God we trust’ declaration on the US dollar note is taken to a higher degree 
when one observes the Nigerian state’s public gatherings. A person from the 
western liberal tradition could be taken by utter surprise, if not apprehension, at 
noticing how every government or non-governmental actor-initiated public 
gathering can only commence after an opening prayer in the name of ‘Allah’ 
and/or ‘Jesus.’ By far, the most contested aspect in modern secular state of 
Nigeria is the government’s sponsoring of islamic pilgrimages to Mecca and the 
Christian pilgrimages to Jerusalem and Rome.18
Nonetheless, a categorical classification of Nigeria as a religious polity is 
thus difficult. In almost all nations of the past and present, religion assumes a 
pivotal role in what we call the political sphere. This is evident even in 
American politics: Habermas observed19 that ‘President Bush has a coalition of 
primarily religiously motivated voters to thank for his victory’ that guaranteed 
his second term in office against all odds.
The religious threading its way deep into the political is exemplified, for 
instance, in the family laws of so-called secular states. As Habermas noted, in a 
number of Muslim countries and in israel, ‘religious family law is either an 
alternative or a substitute for secular civil law’.20 One of the widely debated 
topics during the revision of the Criminal Code in Ethiopia back in 2004 was 
whether bigamy should be outlawed without exceptions. The state had to assume 
a position of an arbitrator while Christian and Muslim values were negotiated. 
Each side pushing for and against the motion, the ultimate decision would lie in 
the hands of the professional machinery of politics which undoubtedly thrives by 
pleasing a substantial majority of its members. In search of the middle, a half­
hearted decision was taken, stating that where exceptionally the custom or 
religion of the spouses permits, bigamy shall not result in criminal prosecution: 
whilst, in principle, it is a criminal act.21
A supportive relation between the state and religious institutions works both 
ways in the sense that the easy way for a politician to increase their chances of a
18 The Pilgrims’ Board that oversees the Islamic pilgrimages to Mecca led Nigerian 
Christians to claim to be treated similarly, leading to the birth of ‘state-sponsored 
Christian pilgrimages to Jerusalem and Rome.’ See Falola, cited in Afe Adogame, 
(2010) ‘How God became a Nigerian: Religious Impulse and the Unfolding of a 
Nation’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol. 28, No 4, pp. 479-498, at 
487.
19 Jurgen Habermas (2006), ‘Religion in the Public Sphere’, European Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol. 14, No 1, pp. 1-25, at 3.
20 See Jurgen Habermas (2006), ‘Religion in the Public Sphere’, European Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol. 14, No 1, pp. 1-25, at 1.
21 While Article 650 of the Criminal Code provides for the criminalisation of the act of 
bigamy, Article 651 provides the exception to it.
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solid win in a constituency is to push for religious values at the top of the policy 
agenda. The success of the Muslim Brotherhood party in Egypt (until its recent 
setback due to President Morsi’s downfall) primarily rests on its core religious 
aspirations. The recent events in Egypt have taught the world community 
historic lessons. We saw the Muslim Brotherhood backing out from the political 
scene initially to give fuller space for the secular movement to march forward. 
The demonstrations had brought an unprecedented number of Egyptian women 
into the streets, with and without headscarves, who loudly chanted slogans, and 
they would have been unlikely to have been seen if the Egyptian demonstrations 
were just an Islamic movement. Those events, both in Egypt and elsewhere, 
have sent a clear message that a society, irrespective of its religious creeds, is 
willing and able to shape its political apparatus.
The question is whether the events portray the forces of modernity, and of the 
secular, trying to break religious submissiveness and subservience; or whether 
the religious values play a unifying role, helping to topple a modern but 
authoritarian political apparatus. It is in everyone’s memory that Tahrir Square 
served both as a field for worship throughout the 28 days of perseverance and a 
peaceful battleground in defence of democracy. Which was instrumental for 
which, religion or modernity as a value statement of the secular, is not yet clear.
It is therefore crucial to acknowledge the fact that the ‘religious and the 
secular do not simply compete with one another but’, as Banu argues, they ‘also 
intersect in complex and sometimes contradictory ways’.22 Once we note the 
impossibility of containing the religious within a compartmentalised ‘sacred 
space’, it is much easier for us to agree with one of the central conclusions of 
Talal Asad which reads:
secular state is not one characterised by religious indifference, or rational 
ethics - or political toleration. It is a complex arrangement of legal reasoning, 
moral practice, and political authority. This arrangement is not the simple 
outcome of the struggle of secular reason against the despotism of religious 
authority.23
2. Blasphemy in a Secular State
We have seen the difficulties involved in drawing up a clear boundary between 
what is religious and what is secular. In other words, it is submitted that even in 
modernity at its best, and where secularism is expressly upheld as a 
constitutional virtue, it is hardly possible for the two spheres to neatly operate
22 See Banu Gokariksel (2009), ‘Beyond the Officially Secular: Religion, secularism and 
the body in the production of subjectivity’, Social and Cultural Geography, Vol. 10, 
No 6, pp 657-674, at 658.
23 See Talal Asad (2003), Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity 
(Stanford University Press, California), p. 255.
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independently of one another. One area where the secular state has, throughout 
history, failed to keep itself away from the religious lives of individuals is the 
law of blasphemy. This is defined, rather simplistically, by St. Thomas Aquinas 
as referring to an act meant ‘to cast insult or abuse at the dignity of our 
creator’.24 However, this cannot be the correct interpretation of the act of 
blasphemy as noted by Asad who wrote, ‘unlike the Christian concept of 
Godhead, Muslims insist that God is not a person - and therefore honour or 
dishonour cannot accrue to him’.25 That being theological discourse, this 
contribution would not touch, it suffices to mention that, whether in islam or 
Christianity, blasphemy is meant to provide protection to ‘sacred truths’ that 
followers of a particular religion dearly hold on to.
The emergence of the law in this area in the English legal system, for 
instance, is traced back to the case of R v Taylor in 1677, by which the King’s 
Bench convicted a man who had described Christ in a degrading manner and 
religion as a fraud. Lord Chief Justice Hale commented that:
...to say religion is a cheat, is to dissolve all those obligations whereby the 
civil societies are preserved, and that Christianity is parcel of the laws of 
England; and therefore to reproach the Christian religion is to speak in 
subversion of the law.26
Thus first, this law of blasphemy was exclusively meant to apply to the Church 
of England, and second, blasphemous utterances were regarded offensive not 
only to God but also the State, as they were deemed subversive of the law. After 
a long period of time, in 1995, blasphemy was re-articulated to regulate the form 
rather than the substance of a statement in and of itself. In other words, denying 
the existence of God per se, let alone to label religion as a fraud, would not be 
considered as subversive; rather, to avoid transgressing the blasphemy laws, the 
manner in which the views are expressed must not be offensive. in the case of R 
v Lemon, before the House of Lords in explaining the exact meaning of 
blasphemy, Lord Scarman stated the following:
24 See Reid Mortensen (1994), ‘Blasphemy in a Secular State: A pardonable sin?’
UNSWLaw Journal, Vol. 17, No 2, pp 409-431, at 410.
25 Talal Asad (2008), ‘Reflections on Blasphemy and Secular Criticism’, in Hent de 
Vries (Ed.), Religion: Beyond a Concept, (Fordham University Press), at 29.
26 R v Taylor (1677), quoted in Mortensen, supra note 24, p 411; It is striking to note 
that the punishment was not that articulated and included a number of measures 
against the ‘offender.’ Mr. Taylor, the defendant, ‘uttered orally many highly offensive 
words against religion, words so wildly violent as to suggest doubts of his sanity [for 
which] he was fined and ordered to be pilloried thrice and to find sureties for his good 
behaviour throughout his life’. See Kenny, Courtney (1922), ‘The evolution of the law 
of blasphemy’, The Cambridge Law Journal, Vol. 1, No 2, pp 127-142, at 129.
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It is not blasphemous to speak or publish opinions hostile to the Christian 
religion or to deny the existence of God, if the publication is couched in 
decent and temperate language. The test to be applied is as to the manner in 
which the doctrines are advocated and not as to the substance of the 
doctrines themselves.27
The last conviction for the crime of blasphemy in the UK was in 1922, when 
William Gott was found guilty of this crime and ‘served nine months of hard 
labour for distributing pamphlets describing how Jesus Christ entered Jerusalem 
because Gott used words28 which were considered blasphemous. This conviction 
has over time been challenged as illiberal, in the sense that it restricts freedom of 
expression, which stands as a pillar for modern secular and democratic society. 
In submitting the proposal to the House of Commons for the abolition of the law 
of blasphemy, the Liberal Democrat Mp Dr. Evan Harris had described the 
reasons for the abolition to be twofold:
...the offence of blasphemy is illiberal because its scope is uncertain ...The 
offence is discriminatory in that it applies only to the Christian religion-and 
within that, only to the tenets of the Church of England.29
Intrinsically therefore, the law of blasphemy was meant to resolve conflicts, as it 
were, that emerge between plaintiffs representing Christian values, and 
defendants who by their statements or actions have injured the former. 
Nevertheless, where the state and its institutions are expected to operate 
tangentially from religion, this form of intrusion into the ‘private’ sphere is 
highly problematic. This being a brief account of the Western and so-called 
secular view on blasphemy,30 it stands on a direct collision course with the
27R v Lemon, quoted in Clive Unsworth (1995), ‘Blasphemy, Cultural Divergence and 
Legal Relativism’, The Modern Law Review, Vol. 58, No 5, pp 658-677, at 662.
28 See Rex v Gott, 1922, p 89, cited in Robert C. Blitt, (2011) ‘The bottom up journey of 
‘defamation of religion’ from Muslim States to the United Nations: A case study of 
the migration of anti-constitutional ideas’, in Austin Sarat (ed.), Human rights: New 
possibilities/new problems, Special Issue Studies in Law, Politics and Society, Vol. 56,
pp. 121-211.
29 See Lucinda Maer (2008), The Abolition of the Blasphemy Offences, House of 
Commons, Parliament and Constitution Centre, SN/PC/04597, (House of Commons 
Library), at 4. The House of Lords had passed the motion for the amendment Bill by 
148 to 87, and it was then confirmed by the House of Commons with 378 to 57. The 
Bill received Royal Assent on 8 May 2008.
30 In this regard, one must not make the mistake of thinking all Western traditions do not 
outlaw acts of blasphemy. Mention could be made of Canada, Denmark, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, and Poland. See Brian J. Grim, (12 Nov 
2012), Laws penalising blasphemy, apostasy and defamation of religion are 
widespread, Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life,
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Islamic subject. This is because the latter holds that ‘any statement defaming a 
religion was equal to a racist statement... and therefore, had nothing to do with 
the enjoyment of the right to freedom of expression’.31
This, however, emerges from the long-standing error of conflating injuries on 
an individual with that of an establishment, whether religious or other. Human 
rights apply to individuals, and as such ‘international human rights law protects 
such individuals from discrimination [racist, religious, political, etc] but does not 
protect the religion itself’.32 in this regard Rebecca Ross concludes, after arguing 
against Canada’s criminal law provision on blasphemy [that had not been 
applied since 1936], that such laws violate freedom of expression, ‘particularly 
because unlike ethnicity, it is expression itself that creates religious doctrine and 
tradition’.33 Moreover, the conflation of religion with that of race is similar to 
considering a mutable trait of human life as an immutable one. L. Bennett 
Graham criticises this trend as follows:
while there is often a relationship between these characteristics, the 
conflation of these concepts has confused the legal protections for each of 
them. Race, an immutable characteristic, is treated by the law differently than 
is religion. Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
guarantees the right to change one's religion. If race and religion continue to 
be conflated, this right will continue to be undermined as religion becomes 
defined as an immutable trait.34
<http://www.pewforum.org/Government/Laws-Penalizing-Blasphemy,-Apostasy-and- 
Defamation-of-Religion-are-Widespread.aspx> last visited 14 Feb 2013; for a critique 
of Canadian blasphemy law, see Rebecca Ross, (2012), ‘Blasphemy and the Modern, 
‘Secular’ State’, Appeal: Review of Current Law and Law Reform, Vol. 17, pp. 3-20.
31 This statement was made by an Azerbaijani representative to the UN when the 
resolution on defamation of religion was discussed. Quoted in Rebecca J. Dobras, 
(2009), ‘Is the United Nations endorsing human rights violations?: An analysis of the 
United Nations combating defamation of religions resolutions and Pakistan’s 
blasphemy laws’, Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 37, 
pp. 339-380, at 365.
32 See Rebecca J. Dobras, id, p. 367.
33 See Robecca Ross, supra note 30, p. 18.
34 See L. Bennett Graham, (2009), ‘Defamation of Religions: The End of Pluralism?’ 
Emory International Law Review, Vol. 23, pp 69-84, at 78; it is important to note that 
the right to change one’s religion is one of the rights that do not feature in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights just settled with ‘the freedom to 
have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice’, substituting the UDHR’s 
stipulation of ‘the freedom to change his religion or belief. See art 18, UNGA, 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III); also see art 
18(1), UNGA, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 
1966, GA Res 2200 A (XXI), United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 999, p. 171.
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It is also submitted that such laws principally aspire to prevent conflicts and 
public disorder in multicultural and pluralistic settings and that very fact alone 
justifies their existence. But is that really so? Blasphemy is essentially, though 
not exclusively, a crime committed (and not omitted) through statements that are 
deemed offensive and thus are meant to restrict one’s freedom of expression. 
Simply put, it is a ‘linguistic offence ... and specifically the contested use of 
language in respect of the sacred’.35 Any purpose that a law of this or any other 
type desires to achieve must, of necessity, be proportional to the ‘costs’ 
involved, or sacrifices to be made - in this case, the restraint on one’s 
fundamental human right.
The possibility of restrictions on freedom of expression is less contested, as 
this is one of the freedoms that are subject to limits by the law in any democratic 
society. Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights stipulates that 
‘the exercise of [freedom of expression] ... may be subject to such formalities, 
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in 
a democratic society’.36 Similarly, Article 19 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, after guaranteeing freedom of expression for all, 
provides for limitations to be imposed by law which are necessary for the respect 
of the rights or reputation of others, for the protection of national security, public 
order, public health or morals.37
However, whether such restriction is worth imposing through the law of 
blasphemy is not that simple to assess. It was even argued that the continued 
existence of the law of blasphemy violates the right to freedom of expression, 
and the right not to be discriminated against on grounds of religion.38 To say that 
blasphemy law plays a role in maintaining public order is also not convincing 
unless this proceeds from a flawed presupposition that giving offence to 
religious values would invariably result in public disorder. Many believe the 
contrary and that in countries like Pakistan, the blasphemy law that prescribes an 
extreme punishment, the death penalty, is a cause of rather than a panacea for 
public disorder.39
A more serious challenge confronting blasphemy law in today’s world is 
cultural and religious pluralism that has become increasingly pronounced across 
societies and civilisations. Hitherto, under-privileged religious and cultural 
groups have started to demand a central place in the lives of individuals, using 
the law of blasphemy to request the prosecution of those whom they consider to
35 See Clive Unsworth, supra note 27, p. 674.
36 See European Convention of Human Rights (1950), Article 10(2)
37 Article 19 (2) & (3) of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (1966).
38 Supra note 15, p 6.
39 See Rebecca J. Dobras, supra note 31, p. 355 ff.
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have offended their values. Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses, and the 
Danish cartoons are but two of the most recent examples that Western societies 
have confronted in the last two decades after the Cold War. The demands for 
political action via the crime of blasphemy were refused, leading to a bitter 
response and a number of self-help measures taken by organised Muslim 
communities.
The overall controversy on blasphemy is symptomatic of the shift, as noted 
by Unsworth, of the ‘focus of political authority from the structural and 
institutional to the discursive, to the ways in which phenomena are represented 
and struggles over meaning’.40 Resolving such controversy, either through a 
universalised blasphemy law or through multiple stipulations based on the 
distinct religious doctrines is both economically and intellectually taxing, and 
not worth trying. One option is to say that the state must retain its temporal 
authority and regulate social behaviour through its coercive tools of executive 
fiat, prevent crimes, distribute losses through economic laws such as tort, and 
deter potential perpetrators by imposing calculated pain on those who have 
offended the penal system. However, this authority has to operate within the 
bounds of neutrality by not engaging in wholesale or piecemeal sponsoring of 
religious values. As noted above, this level of neutrality is, nonetheless, very 
unlikely to be achieved.
Blasphemy also presupposes a collective form of injury, as it relates to a 
violation by expressions (written or verbal) directed against sacred truths that 
permeate a particular religion. Proving this form of collective injury is arduous, 
both from the perspective of the defendants’ guilty state of mind (mens rea) as 
well as from the contents of the act itself- actus reus. The Law Commission of 
England, based on the referral made to it by the House of Lords, produced a 
Working Paper in which it had expressed its concern on the indefiniteness of the 
mens rea required by the blasphemy law41 as well as about the uncertainties of 
its actus reus.42 It noted the difficulty involved in concretely defining, for 
legislative and adjudicative purposes, the terms ‘church’ and ‘religion.’ The 
following remarks in New Law Journal are worth noting:
‘... criminal sanctions in support of the preservation of a shared, collective
social respect for religion cannot rationally be sustained. On the other hand,
40 See Clive Unsworth, supra note 27, p. 675.
41 The Law Commission Working Paper No 79, cited in Micklewright, F.H. Amphlett 
(1981), ‘Blasphemy and the Law Commission’, Law and Justice-Christian Law 
Review, Vol. 7071, pp. 109-115, at 110.
42 See Robilliard, John (1981), ‘Offences against Religion and Public Worship’, The 
Modern Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 5, pp 556-563, at 556.
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the argument for promoting reverence at the public level for the private 
feelings of individual behaviours remains the highest validity.’43
This quote from the New Law Journal brings us to an important ‘compromise’ 
that modern, secular states could legitimately pursue as an alternative to the law 
of blasphemy. This is to ‘promote reverence at the public level for private 
feelings’ through the well-recognised laws of defamation. The notion of the law 
of defamation ‘professes to protect personal character ... without sacrificing 
freedom of thought and the benefit of public discussion’.44 So this shift from the 
collective to the individual, and from the illiberal to the liberal views on faulty 
expressions, would relocate the role of the state to its proper perspective.
Similarly, one of the contested aspects of the UN resolutions on ‘defamation 
of religion’45 has been the absence of a clear definition for both the word 
‘defamation’ as well as the required state of mind on the part of the perpetrator. 
While the proponents of the resolutions championed the idea of providing a 
special place for islam, the opponents have clearly argued against it as being 
discriminatory towards other world religions. With regard to mens rea, the 
dominant view envisages that the act should be intended to incite public 
disorder. This can properly be covered by other laws like the prohibition on hate 
speech and must not be the concern to the law of blasphemy. This is because 
unlike hate speech, blasphemy laws do not require hateful intent and
43 New Law Journal, quoted in Micklewright, supra note 23.
44 See, Van Vechten Veeder (1903), ‘The History and Theory of the Law of 
Defamation’, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 3, No 8, pp 546-573, at 546.
45 It is crucial to note that ‘defamation of religion’ as understood by the proponents of 
those UN resolutions that began in 1999, and which was followed by the adoption of 
at least one resolution every year for over 10 years, is more or less similar to the law 
of blasphemy. In one of its policy papers, the International Humanist and Ethical 
Union (IHEU), an organisation that consistently opposed the resolutions, identifies the 
striking similarities between defamation of religion and blasphemy in the following 
words:
The concept of “defamation of religion” shares many characteristics with the 
concept of ‘blasphemy’ found in anti-blasphemy laws: both concepts favour the 
ideas and institutions of religion over the conscience and expressions of the 
individual; both favour politically powerful forms of religion over dissenting and 
minority forms of religions; and both favour religious beliefs over non-religious 
beliefs. As a result, both prohibit critical evaluation and debate about religions and 
religious institutions in a position of power. And both restrict free inquiry and 
freedom to compare and choose between beliefs.
See Matt Cherry and Roy Brown, (21 October 2009), ‘Speaking freely about religion: 
religious freedom, defamation and blasphemy’, IHEU Policy Paper, 
<http://www.iheu.org/files/Speaking%20Freely%20about%20Religion.pdf> last 
visited 19 February 2013.
accordingly, ‘punishing a speech that involves no hateful intent violates freedom 
of expression’.46
The concept of ‘Margin of Appreciation’ needs to be noted in relation with 
the balance between freedom of expression and blasphemy laws. This concept 
gives recognition for variation in the application of freedom of expression in 
different contexts. This can be illustrated by the decisions of the European Court 
of Human Rights in Wingrove v United Kingdom and Otto-Preminger v Austria.
The application of Nigel Windgrove for a classification certificate to a film 
titled ‘Visions of Ecstasy’ was rejected by the British Board of Film 
Classification “pursuant to the Video Recordings Act 1984, not because of its 
sexual imagery but on the ground that the video infringed the criminal law of 
blasphemy”.47 His appeal to the European Court of Human Rights was not 
successful because the European Court by a majority of seven votes to two, 
found that national authorities are “entitled to consider that the impugned 
measure was justified as being necessary in a democratic society within the 
meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 10” and “there is no violation of Article 10 of 
the Convention”.48
The Court recalled that “freedom of expression constitutes one of the 
essential foundations of a democratic society” under Article 10(2) of the 
Convention, but meanwhile stated that this right carries with it duties and 
responsibilities including “a duty to avoid as far as possible an expression that is, 
in regard to objects of veneration, gratuitously offensive to others and 
profanatory”.49 The European court held that:
in examining whether restrictions to the rights and freedoms guaranteed by 
the Convention can be considered ‘necessary in a democratic society’ ... the 
Contracting States enjoy a certain but not unlimited margin of appreciation. It 
is, in any event, for the European Court to give a final ruling on the 
restriction’s compatibility with the Convention and it will do so by assessing 
in the circumstances of a particular case, inter alia, whether the interference 
corresponded to a ‘pressing social need’ and whether it was ‘proportionate to 
the legitimate aim pursued’.50
This decision was preceded by Otto-Preminger Institute v. Austria 51 in which 
the applicant’s attempt to show a film offended the religious feelings of the 46 47 48 49 50 51
42_________________Mizan Law Review______________ Vol. 7 No.1, September 2013
46 See Rebecca J. Dobras, supra note 31, p. 356.
47 Stephanie Palmer (1997), “Blasphemy and the Margin of Appreciation” The 
Cambridge Law Journal, Vol. 56, No. 3 (November 1997), p. 470.
48 Wingrove v The United Kingdom, 17419/90 [Chamber Judgment [1996] ECHR 60 (25 
November 1996], para 62.
49 Id, para 52.
50 Id, para 53.
51 Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, (13470/87) [1994] ECHR 26 (20 September 1994)
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many Catholics in Tyrol (which is inhabited by a large majority of Catholics). 
The film was banned by Austrian authorities. Upon appeal, the European Court 
of Human Rights upheld the ban by extending “the margin of appreciation to 
Austrian Catholics in recognition of their greater religious sensitivity”.52 Kahn 
duly raises the issue whether it is “possible to extend the same ‘margin of 
appreciation’ to Muslims (especially those in Europe) who in response to anti­
Muslim speech and acts have called for laws punishing the defamation of 
religions?”53
3. ‘Blasphemy’ under Ethiopian law
Articles 27 and 90 of the FDRE Constitution provide for freedom of religion and at 
the same time state the grounds for limiting this freedom. While sub-Articles 1 to 4 of 
Article 27 deal with freedom of religion, sub-Article 5 indicates the possible 
limitations “as are prescribed by law ... to protect public safety, peace, health, 
education, public morality or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others, and 
to ensure the independence of the state from religion”. The words ‘independence 
of the state from religion’ articulate secularism. The fact that education shall be 
“free from any religious influence, political partisanship or cultural prejudices” 
as enshrined in Article 90(2) of the FDRE Constitution further shows the level of 
secularism envisaged under Ethiopia’s Constitution. The scope of this article, 
however, does not allow detailed discussion on these constitutional provisions, 
and particular attention is given to two specific provisions that deal with 
blasphemy under Ethiopia’s 2004 Criminal Code.
The Ethiopian law on blasphemy has two parts: while the first could be said 
to proscribe an act of defaming a religion, the second, classified as a petty 
offence, relates to the criminalisation of blasphemous utterances.54 This is also 
an area of the criminal law that has seen no change during the revision of the 
1957 Penal Code of Ethiopia.55 The first of these two crimes, titled ‘outrage on 
religious peace and feeling’, under Article 492 of the 2004 Criminal Code, reads 
as follows:
52 Robert A. Kahn (2010), Tragedy a Margin of Appreciation for Muslims? Viewing the 
Defamations of Religions Debate through Otto-Preminger Institute v. Austria (University 
of Thomas School of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 10-27), p. 3.
53 Ibid.
54 See art 492 of the Criminal Code for defamation of religion and art 816 for 
blasphemous or scandalous utterances or attitudes.
55 These two crimes were provided for in exactly the same way under the repealed Penal 
Code, by Articles 486 and 771 respectively.
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Whoever publicly56;
a) prevents the solemnisation of, or disturbs or scoffs at, an authorised 
religious ceremony or office, or
b) profanes a place, image or object used for religious ceremonies,
is punishable with a fine not exceeding one thousand Birr, or with simple 
imprisonment not exceeding two years.
According to this provision, an act would be regarded as an outrage on religious 
peace and feeling not only because of the perpetrator’s intent of doing those 
injurious deeds, but also because of its being ‘public.’ Therefore, this publicity 
requirement is the essence that renders the act an outrage to ‘religious peace and 
feeling.’ The crime of defamation is also underpinned by a similar requirement, 
as it must be addressed to a ‘third party’ with the intent to injure the honour or 
reputation of the victim.57 There is, however, a clear difference in the nature of 
‘publicity’, in the sense that, for defamation, communicating the defamatory 
word or act to a single third party is enough to meet this requirement. when it 
comes to outrage on religious peace and feeling, the acts of preventing or 
disturbing religious ceremonies or profaning religious place, images or objects 
may hardly fulfil the act’s requirement under this provision if they are done 
before only a single third party.
The other provision of the 2004 Criminal Code which directly deals with 
blasphemy is Article 816. It applies where a person:
in a public place or in a place open to the public or that can be viewed by the 
public, by gestures or words scoffs at religion or expresses himself in a 
manner which is blasphemous, scandalous or grossly offensive to the feelings 
or convictions of others or towards the Divine Being or the religious symbols, 
rites or religious personages.58
This provision falls under the Code of Petty Offences and imposes a punishment 
of fine or arrest not exceeding one month. The lighter punishment to be imposed 
and the requirement complaint by an aggrieve party in all petty crimes usually 
makes those sections of the Ethiopian criminal law relatively lenient compared 
to the category of ‘serious’ crimes.59
56 The Amharic version of this statement has a clear indication of the mensrea as it says
AM nh£nn£”, which roughly means ‘whoever with intent publicly’. The 
usual invocation of the Negarit Gazette Establishment Proclamation Article 4(2) 
would, therefore, support our preference for this Amharic version and the required 
mental element is ‘intention.’ See Federal Negarit Gazette Establishment 
Proclamation 3/1995, Federal Negarit Gazette, Year 1, No 3, 22 August 1995.
57 See article 613 of the Criminal Code.
58 See article 816 of the Criminal Code.
59 See generally Franklin F. Russell (1961), ‘The New Ethiopian Penal Code’, The 
American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 10, No 3, pp. 265-277.
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Distinction in the levels of criminalisation of these acts (that essentially 
describe blasphemy in one way or the other) lacks clear articulation. What is 
being protected by Article 492 - whether it is the religion or the religious person 
- is not apparent. The reference in the title to an ‘outrage to religious feeling’ 
gives the impression that it underscores the human aspect of the injury caused by 
the act, as one may hardly attribute a ‘feeling’ to a religion. One would observe 
that Article 492(a), under which the perpetrator disturbs the religious ceremony, 
deals with an outrage to religious peace. And Article 492(b) is more of an 
outrage to a religious feeling that a believer has towards a religious place, image 
or object.
The first aspect of that provision implies that the religion and not the believer 
is the one within its purview of protection. This personification of religion, for 
purposes of criminal liability, renders the provision problematic when it comes 
to real life application. On the basis of the secularism and human rights 
perspectives concerning the subject, the law should aspire to protect the believer 
and not religion per se.
Since the year 1999, the UN has been adopting resolutions aimed at the 
protection of religion against defamation, about which Rebecca Dobras has 
provided a comprehensive review showing the views of opponents and 
proponents.60 The passage of the resolutions was highly influenced by the 
Organisation of the islamic conference (Oic), which mobilised support from 
member states.61 As is evident from the recently adopted General Comment No. 
34 of the Human Rights Committee, the position of opponents has obtained 
greater influence. As Dobras notes:
The opposing states expressed concern that the Defamation Resolutions 
address religion, an issue that had never before been the subject of 
international protection. Opponents argue that the defamation of religion is 
not always a recognised human right. International human rights law protects 
individuals from discrimination but does not protect the religion itself. So in 
order for there to be a human rights violation, the action must incite 
discrimination or interfere with an individual’s religious freedom... Similarly, 
the International Humanist and Ethical Union (IHEU) main representative 
stated, ‘lack of respect for a belief should not be confused with hatred of the 
believer,’ and ‘it is the believer that merits protection, not the belief.62
60 See Rebecca J. Dobras, supra note 31; for the complete list of those resolutions, see 
the Rebecca J Dobras footnote 5, p. 341.
61 She noted that ‘no Western country has ever voted in favour of any of the defamation 
resolutions, arguing they focus selectively on Islam; protect the religion itself instead 
of protecting individuals from religious discrimination, and unlawfully restrict 
freedom of expression’. Rebecca J. Dobras, supra note 31, p. 342.
62 See Rebecca J Dobras, supra note 31, pp. 367-368
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The terminology ‘defamation of religion’ within the context of the UN 
resolutions encountered a serious setback when the recently adopted Human 
Rights Council Resolution re-articulated the concept in a more neutral frame. 
The Resolution, 16/18, titled, ‘combating intolerance, negative stereotyping and 
stigmatisation of, and discrimination, incitement to violence and violence 
against, persons based on religion or belief’ has omitted the use of defamation of 
religion.63 As can be discerned from this title, it is the ‘persons of religion or 
belief’ who merit protection and the resolution rather underscores the need for 
interfaith and intercultural dialogue. To this end, the resolution recognises:
... that the open public debate of ideas, as well as interfaith and intercultural 
dialogue, at the local, national and international levels can be among the best 
protections against religious intolerance and can play a positive role in 
strengthening democracy and combating religious hatred, and ... that a 
continuing dialogue on these issues can help overcome existing 
misperceptions.64
Subsequently, the Human Rights Committee adopted its latest General Comment 
No. 34 on ‘Freedoms of Opinion and Expression’ that directly declares laws of 
blasphemy objectionable in light of the Covenant provisions:
Prohibitions of displays of lack of respect for a religion or other belief 
system, including blasphemy laws, are incompatible with the Covenant, 
except in the specific circumstances envisaged in Article 20, paragraph 2, of 
the Covenant. Such prohibitions must also comply with the strict 
requirements of Article 19, paragraph 3, as well as such Articles as 2, 5, 17, 
18 and 26. Thus, for instance, it would be impermissible for any such laws to 
discriminate in favour of or against one or certain religions or belief systems, 
or their adherents over another, or religious believers over non-believers. Nor 
would it be permissible for such prohibitions to be used to prevent or punish 
criticism of religious leaders or commentary on religious doctrine and tenets 
of faith.65
The current human rights discourse appears, therefore, to be shifting towards a 
restrictive use of blasphemy laws only within the context of ‘hate speech’, which 
can be applied as a legitimate ground to restrict free speech because of the 
content of the act or utterances that may be deemed as an advocacy to incite 
discrimination, hostility or violence of a national, racial, or religious nature.66
63 See United Nations Human Rights Council, ‘Combating intolerance, negative 
stereotyping and stigmatisation of, and discrimination, incitement to violence and 
violence against, persons based on religion or belief, 12 April, A/HRC/RES/16/18.
64 See the Resolution 16/18, id., para 4.
65 See Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 34: Article 19: Freedoms of 
opinion and expression’ 21 July 2011, CCPR/C/GC/34, para 48.
66 See Art 20(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
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With regard to Article 492 of the Ethiopian Criminal Code, the provision 
does not seem to relate to hate speech nor to objectionable acts of blasphemy in 
its totality. This is because the provision does not specifically consider 
utterances or speech as the act constituting the violation under its ambit. 
Although some of its aspects could be regarded as blasphemy, the classical 
understanding of it, as ‘irreverence toward God, religion, a religious icon, or 
something else considered sacred’,67 is more related to Article 816 than an 
‘outrage to religious peace and feeling’ envisaged under Article 492. Objective 
standards are missing to judiciously determine what may constitute ‘an 
authorised religious ceremony’, ‘profaning (^chrt) of religious places, images or 
objects’, and as to what may be regarded as outrage to religious feeling.
Article 492 thus opens the door for open-ended and incomprehensible issues 
that are difficult to answer. Criticisms are mounting globally from the perspective 
of secular and democratic states thereby necessitating objective standards and 
clarity with regard to Article 492. Moreover, a revisit to the petty offence 
provision on blasphemy (under Article 816) is necessary because the provision 
takes non-verifiable sacred truths (and not the believer) as deserving protection. 
The very idea of including the blasphemy provision within the petty offences 
section of the 1957 Penal Code (and then under a similar section of the 2004 
Criminal Code) indicates the societal readiness for tolerance towards religious 
criticisms within the multicultural and multi-religious context. Whether we still 
have to maintain this provision and refrain from enhancing the level of tolerance 
in freedom of expression is an issue the legislature needs to attend to.
Conclusion
The focus on the human dignity of individuals as subjects of violation, rather 
than religious truths affecting a collectivity, will enable us to establish objective 
criteria for proof of violations. The ‘reasonable person’ standard, applied 
routinely in secular democratic societies as a measure of good behaviour, cannot 
function as such in blasphemy trials or so-called crimes of ‘defamation of 
religion.’ The modern laws of secular societies also provide protection to group 
sensibilities based on race, religion, ethnicity, colour, etc., and penalise ‘hostile 
expressions directed towards a person on the basis of [those] characteristics’. 
However, blasphemy - in its contemporary understanding, basically consists of 
‘vilification of [religious] beliefs (rather than believers)’.68 It was stated that
67 See Maxim Grinberg, (2006), ‘Defamation of religions v. Freedom of expression: 
Finding the balance in a democratic society”, Sri Lanka Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 18, pp. 197-222, at 211.
68 See Harris, Bed (1998), ‘Should Blasphemy be a Crime? The ‘Piss Christ’ Case and 
Freedom of Expression’, Melbourne University Law Review, Vol, 22, pp 217-229, at 
224.
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John Locke ‘believed the Christian religion to be true but did not know it to be 
true and resolved that no political institution could make any stronger claim’.69 
This clearly makes a distinction between empirical knowledge and mere belief, 
and strictly speaking the state is not in a position to ‘define religious truths and 
errors’.70
The law of blasphemy militates against freedom of expression for it 
criminalises a speech which is considered injurious to a particular religion, 
irrespective of the mental state of the perpetrator. in a democratic setting where 
there exists a ‘wall of separation’ between state and religion, ‘that wall must be 
kept high and impregnable.’71 The Ethiopian criminal law provisions treat the 
subject in two different headings within the special part as well as the petty 
offences section: while the first exhibits a case where an act of disturbance on 
and profaning of religious ceremonies or objects is criminalised, the other 
explicitly prohibits blasphemous utterances. The subjective character of religious 
peace as well as feeling stated under Article 492 of the Criminal Code denies it 
meaning and practical application. The petty offences section on blasphemy is 
also anachronistic in a democracy and accordingly requires revising. This 
becomes more pressing if the country has to live up to its human rights 
commitment under the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights. ____________ ■
69 Mortensen, supra note 24, p 426.
70 Ibid.1 See Thomas Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptists, 1 January 1802, First 
Principles Series, the Heritage Foundation <http://www.heritage.org/initiatives/first- 
principles/primary-sources/jefferson-s-letter-to-the-danbury-baptists> last visited 21 
February 2013.
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